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1. Introduction
What is the inﬂuence of federal elections on the size and distribution
of local public goods? Since the central government imposes taxes
on households across the country and provides inter-governmental
transfers to sub-national governments, we could expect that the ﬁscal
policy of the federal government would have a sizeable inﬂuence on
the size and distribution of local public goods in a federation. The
inﬂuence of the central government on local public spending would be
more evident in those economies with a high degree of ﬁscal central-
ization. Although in the last decades many countries have engaged
in reforms intended to move towards ﬁscal decentralization, there are
many developing and developed economies in which ﬁscal policy is
highly centralized (for evidence of this see Ter-Minassian 1997).
The positive theory of public economics has emphasized that the
ﬁscal policy of the central government is inﬂuenced by electoral incen-
tives and political institutions. For instance, Downs (1957), Meltzer
and Richards (1981), Persson and Tabellini (2002a) and many others
argue that economic policy is likely to reﬂect the fact that policy mak-
ers are elected in democracies. Therefore, the parties’ political com-
petition for votes in federal elections creates incentives for parties to
recognize the relative merits of diﬀerent economic policies according
to the ability of these policies to gain electoral support for parties in
federal elections. Hence, the main objective of this paper is to provide
a politico-economic analysis of how the parties’ electoral competition
to win federal elections might determine the policies enacted by the
central government in our economy, that is, the size and distribution
of local public goods.
To do so, we analyze a voting equilibrium for an economy with
heterogeneous preferences and endowments of voters across districts
to which the central government provides transfers to ﬁnance the pro-
vision of local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers.
Our analysis builds on the probabilistic voting model, see Enelow and
Hinich (1989) and Coughlin (1992), which emphasizes that parties
have imperfect information on the voters’ preferences over the ﬁscal
policy of the government. Although there are few applications of the
probabilistic voting theory to the analysis of public economics, to the
best of our knowledge, there is not any application of the probabilistic
voting model to the analysis of the inﬂuence of central-government
ﬁscal policy on the size and distribution of local public goods. This
paper seeks to contribute towards ﬁlling this gap.1
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In this paper, parties compete in a federal election by announcing
binding policies regarding a general income tax on all residents and
inter-governmental transfers to the diﬀerent districts in the country
that help to ﬁnance the provision of local public goods. Voters ob-
serve the candidates’ platforms and vote sincerely for the policy that
is closer to their own views on local public spending. After the federal
election takes place, the candidate with the highest relative plural-
ity of the votes in the federal election is elected, forms the federal
government, and implements the policy platform of the party.
The main contributions of this paper are the following: ﬁrst, we
show that the parties’ competition for votes in the federal election
creates incentives for parties to establish inter-governmental trans-
fers that lead to a Pareto eﬃcient provision of local public goods with
and without inter-regional spillovers. This outcome is diﬀerent from
the predictions of the median voter model (see Downs 1957, Lock-
wood 2002, and Persson and Tabellini 2002b) and partisan models
of electoral competition (see Roemer 1997, 2001) because these mod-
els predict that the provision of local public goods with and without
inter-regional spillover is, in general, Pareto ineﬃcient. In contrast,
our analysis identiﬁes conditions in which parties have incentives to
recognize the beneﬁts and costs of local public goods for all residents
in the economy and, consequently, local public goods with and with-
out inter-regional spillovers are Pareto eﬃcient.
Second, in this paper we show that the central government has
political incentives to produce diﬀerentiated and uniform local public
goods. This outcome is diﬀerent from most normative and positive
analysis that consider that the heterogeneity of the households pref-
erences across districts has a strictly positive monotone eﬀect on the
distribution of local public goods.2 We show, under general assump-
tions, that this is not necessarily the case. In particular, diﬀerentiated
local public goods arise if the voters’ preferences over local public
spending are not too heterogeneous across districts and the inter-
regional spillovers of local public goods are moderate. Therefore, for
this class of equilibria, the heterogeneity in the voters’ preferences for
of government spending see Trimidas (2001), and for analysis of its application
to taxation see Hettich and Winer (1999), Kochi and Ponce (forthcoming), and
Ponce (2010).
2 The heterogeneity of the households’ preferences across districts has a stric-
tly positive monotoneeﬀect on the inter-regionaldistributionof local public goods
if higher diﬀerences in the voters’ preferences for local public goods across dis-
tricts are translated into higher diﬀerences in the size of local public goods across
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local public spending and the extent of spillovers of local public goods
between districts i and -i has a strictly positive monotone eﬀect on
the inter-regional distribution of local public goods.
However, the heterogeneity of the voters’ preferences for local
public goods between districts i and -i does not have a strictly pos-
itive monotone eﬀect on the provision of local public goods if the
preferences of voters over local public goods are too heterogeneous
across districts and the size and asymmetry of spillovers of local pub-
lic goods is suﬃciently high. In this case, the central government has
political incentives to provide a uniformly local public good. This
outcome can explain why in some countries the central government
tends to concentrate resources in certain regions of the country (see
Ter-Minassian 1997).
Moreover, the issue of a uniform versus a diﬀerentiated provision
of local public goods is central for the theory of ﬁscal federalism. In
the analysis of Oates (1972), the celebrated decentralization theorem
requires that the central government provide a uniform local public
good.3
However, as Lockwood (2002) points out, the hypothesis of pol-
icy uniformity in the analysis of Oates (1972) is ad hoc, since it is
not derived from the underlying behavior of the government.4 Know-
ing what type of politico-economic conditions might induce the cen-
tral government to provide uniform versus diﬀerentiated local public
goods would be useful to make meaningful comparative analyses of
the decentralization theorem for representative democracies.5
3 Oates (1972) identiﬁes a set of conditions that leads to the celebrated De-
centralization Theorem in which the decentralized and diﬀerentiated provision of
Pareto eﬃcient local public goods by a system of sub-nationalgovernments is wel-
fare superior to the Pareto eﬃcient but uniform provision of local public goods
by the central government.
4 Clearly, under perfect information and full discretion in policy making, a
benevolent central planner could maximize the nationwide social welfare by pre-
scribing sub-national transfers that lead to diﬀerentiated local public goods. The
consequence of giving full discretion to the central government in the analysis of
Oates (1972) is that the ﬁscally centralized provision of local public goods might
be welfare equivalent to the decentralized provision. In this case, ﬁscal decentral-
ization might not be needed.
5 The analysis of Oates (1972, 1995) considers that governments are ruled by
benevolent social planners. Hence, it is not clear if the decentralization theorem
can survive if we relax this assumption and introduce political competition and
political institutions that can shape the design of ﬁscal policies. For this reason
it is theoretically relevant to extend the analysis of ﬁscal federalism considering
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Finally, in this paper we provide a comparative analysis to study
the inﬂuence of political competition, the extent of inter-regional
spillovers of local public goods, the distribution of the population
in the economy and the size and distribution of local public spending.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 includes the liter-
ature review and puts into context the contributions of our paper.
Section 3 develops a probabilistic voting model to rationalize the size
and distribution of local public goods. Section 4 considers a compar-
ative analysis of the voting equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature Review
There is a large literature on the provision of local public goods. At
the core of the normative theory of ﬁscal federalism, Oates (1972,
1995) considers governments controlled by benevolent social planners
and emphasizes the tradeoﬀ between the heterogeneity of preferences
across districts and eﬃciency in the provision of local public goods.
An issue of theoretical interest related with this literature is whether
providing diﬀerentiated versus uniform local public goods is rational
for policy makers. The normative theory of federalism assumes that
the federal government is constrained to provide a uniform public
good. However, Lockwood (2002) points out that the hypothesis of
policy uniformity is ad hoc, since it is not derived from the underly-
ing government behavior. Clearly, under perfect information and full
discretion in policy making, a benevolent central planner could maxi-
mize the nationwide social welfare by prescribing sub-national trans-
fers that lead to local public goods that are diﬀerentiated according to
the heterogeneity of preferences of individuals across regions. In this
case, the consequence of allowing full discretion to the central gov-
ernment in the analysis of Oates (1972) is that ﬁscal decentralization
might not be needed.
Our paper relaxes the assumptions that governments are ruled by
benevolent planners and that the central government is constrained
to provide a uniform local public good. In this paper we show that
highly heterogeneous preferences of voters over local public goods
across districts and suﬃciently high spillovers lead the central gov-
ernment to provide a uniform and Pareto eﬃcient local public good
because of strategic political behavior. In this paper, we also char-
acterize a class of equilibria in which a diﬀerentiated provision of
contributes in this direction.128 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
local public goods is compatible with the parties’ political objectives
if the inter-regional preferences over local spending and the size and
distribution of spillovers from local public goods are moderate. The
main contribution of these outcomes is to show that the heterogene-
ity across districts of the voters’ preferences concerning local public
goods has a non-monotone eﬀect on the distribution of local public
goods (more heterogeneity of the voters’ preferences across district
does not necessarily lead to more inter-regional diﬀerentiation in the
supply of local public goods).
Another line of research of the normative theory argues that eq-
uity concerns provide a rationale for the central government to provide
inter-governmental transfers since poverty reduction requires national
standards, see Ladd and Doolittle (1982). Moreover, if individuals are
altruistic, see Pauly (1973), then local redistribution could be lower
than the level of redistribution that is socially optimal.6 Feldstein and
Wrobel (1998)also argue that local governments wouldnot be success-
ful in redistributing income due to inter-regional migration. Lastly,
a divergence between the resources of a locality and the wanted or
needed local public outlays provides another rationale for the central
government to establish inter-governmental transfers, see Boadway
and Flatters (1982b), Boadway (2006) and Bernd-Spahn (2007).
Many others have emphasized that the central government can
establish inter-governmental transfers that might improve the eﬃ-
ciency in the allocation of resources. Boadway and Flatters (1982a),
Smart (1998) y Bucovetsky y Smart (2006) argue that, in a system of
sub-national governments, taxes might lead to excessive deadweight
costs from tax competition among local governments. The central
government could provide a more eﬃcient tax system that avoids
wasteful tax competition. Oates (1995) argues that the decentral-
ized provision of local public goods with inter-regional spillovers will
produce lower than optimal local public goods since sub-national gov-
ernments might not incorporate the spillovers of local public goods in
ﬁscal policy design. In this case, the central government can provide
Pigouvian taxes-transfers to induce Pareto eﬃcient local spending.
In our paper we are also concerned with eﬃciency and redistribu-
tion in the provision of local public goods. In our probabilistic voting
model, candidates aggregate the preferences of the whole electorate;
6 This is the case because local redistribution could be thought of as a local
publicgoodwith inter-regionalspilloversand the localprovisionof thislocal public
good does not recognize the inter-regional spillovers from local redistribution. It
follows that, at the equilibrium, the amount of redistribution provided by local
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and local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers are
Pareto eﬃcient. Our model, however, is diﬀerent from the normative
theory since we relax the assumption that governments are benevolent
and introduce the role of the electoral competition as a determinant
of ﬁscal policy design. Our model is also diﬀerent from determinis-
tic models of political competition, see Meltzer and Richards (1981),
Persson and Tabellini (2002b) and Besley and Coate (2003) and for
partisan models of electoral competition see Roemer (2001) and Khe-
mani (2003), since these models predict that local public goods are
not Pareto eﬃcient while our model identiﬁes conditions under which
local public goods are Pareto eﬃcient.7
In our political equilibrium parties also recognize the redistribu-
tive properties of the provision of local public goods. However, re-
distribution is not explained by concerns of policy makers over the
equitable distribution of gains from ﬁscal policy (as in the normative
theory) but by political incentives to maximize votes by redistribut-
ing the gains from the ﬁscal exchange in favor of inﬂuential coalitions
of voters. In our model, political inﬂuence and redistribution are de-
termined by the expected votes that diﬀerent coalitions of voters can
deliver in the election.
3. Voting in Federal Elections for State Transfers to Finance
Local Public Goods
In this section we develop a probabilistic voting model to rationalize
the provision of local public goods. Our focus is to develop suﬃcient
conditions to explain the size and distribution of local public goods
as a result of a voting equilibrium in a ﬁscally centralized economy.
7 There are other diﬀerences between our probabilistic voting model and the
median voter model. Here, we mention just one of the diﬀerences that have re-
ceived a great deal of attention in the literature: the median voter model does
not have a majoritarian equilibrium for a large economy in which policy is mul-
tidimensional and preferences of voters are heterogeneous. However, in the real
world policy is multidimensional and empirical evidence suggests, see Borcherd-
ing and Holsey (1997) and Mueller (2003), that the heterogeneity of preferences
of household is an important determinant of the government’s spending and tax
policies. Hence, the median voter model seems limited in its application to the
analysis of inter-governmental transfers that help to ﬁnance the provision of local
public goods in a federation. In contrast, in our paper we provide a probabilistic
voting model with a political equilibrium for a large economy in which policy is
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Conﬂicts among residents in the same district (and among voters of
diﬀerent districts) over the size of the government arise because of
heterogeneous preferences and endowments of voters within the same
district and across districts. The collective choice mechanism that
resolves the diﬀerences of voters over ﬁscal policy is the delegation
of decision-making power to a policy maker elected in a nationwide
election who then designs transfers to the diﬀerent districts in the
economy that ﬁnance the provision of local public goods.
In a two party system, with parties Z = {L,R}, candidates com-
pete in a federal election by proposing a ﬁscal platform constituted by
an income tax on residents that ﬁnances a transfer from the federal
government to each district in the economy to provide local public
goods.8,9 For simplicity, we dont model the choice of taxation and
spending of local authorities since our main interest is to develop
a model of ﬁscal centralization that explain the inﬂuence of politi-
cal competition in federal elections on the size and distribution of
inter-governmental transfers that help to ﬁnance the provision of lo-
cal public goods.10 For this reason, we just assume that local spending
is ﬁnanced by the federal transfers to districts i and −i.11
The timing of the model is as follows: in the ﬁrst stage, candi-
dates announce binding policies regarding the size of a federal income
8 It is important to highlight the relevance of providing a model with ﬁscal
centralization. First, this model would provide a benchmark to compare with
more complex models in which we consider strategic considerations between the
central and sub-national governments. Second, the literature concerning ﬁscal
policy in a centralized economy is well established (see Oates 1972, 1995 among
many others). Hence our paper would complement this literature since we are not
aware of an application of the probabilistic voting theory to the analysis of local
public goods in a ﬁscally centralized economy. Our paper contributes to ﬁll this
gap.
9 In this paper we analyze a model for an economy with a majoritarian elec-
toral system with a two party system. However, Ponce (2010) identiﬁesconditions
for which our results would also be valid for economies with a proportional rep-
resentation electoral system and multi-party electoral competition.
10 In another paper Kochi and Ponce (2011) relax the assumption of a ﬁscally
centralized economy by considering explicitly the strategic interaction between
the central and sub-national governments in providing local public goods.
11 An alternative to avoid strategic considerations between the federal and
sub-nationalgovernments is to consider exogenously given sub-national taxes and
spending. However, this extension does not change the qualitative interpreta-
tions of our model. For this reason, we simply normalize sub-national taxes and
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tax and the distribution of transfers from the central government to
the diﬀerent districts (regions) of the economy that ﬁnance the pro-
vision of local public goods. Parties design ﬁscal policy to maximize
their share of the vote in the federal election. In the second stage,
voters observe the candidates’ platforms and vote sincerely for the
policy that is closer to their own views on local public spending. All
voters vote and voters are not mobile. At the end of the second stage,
the elected candidate with the highest relative plurality of the votes
in the federal election is elected, forms the federal government, and
implements the policy platform of his party.
In this setting, the competition of parties for votes leads to a
process of preference aggregation in which parties aggregate the pref-
erences of voters over local public goods according to the marginal
propensity of diﬀerent voters to vote for some party in the federal
election. This means that the distribution of the ideal policies of
voters over local spending is one of the fundamental determinants of
ﬁscal policy design.12 We can characterize the distribution of the vot-
ers’ ideal policy positions over local spending by considering the ideal
provision of the local public good of citizen type ei in district i which
is given by g∗i(ei) ∈ argmax v(gi,g−i,ei), where v(gi,g−i,ei) is the
indirect utility function over feasible local public goods ﬁnanced by










s.t : a) xi = eili(1 − τ) ∀ ei ∈
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Preferences of a resident of district i are given by µ(xi,li,gi +
k−ig−i) = ln(xi) + ln(1 − li) + ln(gi + k−ig−i) where xi is a private
good, 1−li is the households leisure, and li ∈ [0,1] is the household’s
labor supply.13 Moreover, Gi = gi + k−ig−i where gi and g−i are
12 The diﬀerences among the voters preferences and income explain the voters’
diﬀerences over the ideal size of local public goods. For instance, if local public
goods are normal goods then we should expectthat voters with high income prefer
an ideal size of local public goods that is higher than the ideal size of local public
spending of low income voters.
13 By assuming li∈[0,1] we have normalized the maximum time that a worker
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local public goods provided in districts i and −i, and k−i ∈ [0,1] is
a parameter measuring the extent of inter-regional spillovers of g−i
which represents the beneﬁts to residents of district i of the local
public good provided in district −i.14 The individual’s budget is
xi = eili(1 − τ) where ei is the consumer’s earning ability (or wage),
eili is the income from labor services, τ is an income tax on labor
income, and






is the budget constraint of the federal government in which local
public goods are ﬁnanced by a linear income tax system.15
The distribution of ideal policies over local public goods of the
voters in district i,g∗i(ei), is indexed by the distribution of the voter’s
types in the district which density is given by















where Ni is the population in district i and NT = Ni + N−i.
For the analysis that follows we make the following assumptions.








14 The local public goods provided by some district might beneﬁt residents of
other districts due to the properties of non exclusivity and non rivalry of local
public goods, see Oates (1972, 1999).
15 The budget constraint of the government reﬂects the optimal labor supply
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Assumption A1 characterizes the heterogeneity in the distribu-
tion of the population between districts i and −i. Assumption A2
means that the average income in district i is higher than the average
income in district −i. Without loss of generality, assumptions A1
and A2 say that the average preferences for local public goods from
voters of district i is higher than that of residents of district −i.
Under the ﬁscal platforms of parties Z = {L,R}, the utilities
of a voter type ei under the administrations of parties L and R are,
respectively, vLi(gLi,gL−i,ei) and vRi(gRi,gR−i,ei). Sincere voting











if χLi < 0 he votes for party R, and the voter ﬂips a coin if χLi = 0.
Parties have imperfect knowledge on the distribution of the vot-
ers’ preferences over local public goods. Hence, the probability that











where F Li(˜ χLi) is the cumulative distribution over ˜ χLi and
fLi(˜ χLi) = dF Li(˜ χLi)/dχLi.
The share of the expected votes in the federal election for parties















s.t : a) TZi = gZi ∀ i, ∀ Z = {L,R}









Where TZi is the level of the transfer from the central govern-
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gZi ∀ i, ∀ Z = {L,R}. Condition (a) says that all transfers to district
i are used to provide a local public good in the district and condition
(b) is the government’s budget constraint.16, 17
DEFINITION. The electoral equilibrium for our economy is character-
ized by policy choices τ∗Z,T∗Zi and T∗Z−i ∀ Z = {L,R} and voting
choices for voters type ei in districts i and −i such that
I) In the ﬁrst stage parties select T∗Zi = g∗Zi ∀ i, ∀ Z = {L,R}
such that
















II) In the second stage, voters type ei in districts i and −i observe














16 In our model parties seek to maximize the expected share of the votes while
in the Downs’ model parties maximize the probability of winning the election.
As Aranson, Hinich and Ordeshook (1974) show, if all voters vote in the election
then the candidatespolicy strategiesat the political equilibriumare equivalentfor
candidates that maximize the expected share of the vote with those candidates
that select policy to win elections. Since we have assumed that all voters vote, our
ﬁndings do not change if we assume that the parties’ objective is to maximize the
expected share of the votes or maximize their probability of winning the election
(although our results are not the same as the predictions of the median voter
model). However, if voters can abstain, then this is not longer the case and the
partiesoptimal policies will dependon the objectivethat partiesseek to maximize.
It is not obvious to us how the results of our model would be modiﬁed if we allow
abstentions. We leave this for future work.
17 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the issue discussed in our
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We proceed to develop the main result of this section. In theorem
1 we characterize the optimal design of inter-governmental transfers
that ﬁnance the provision of local public goods.
THEOREM 1. Under A1, A2, probabilistic voting in federal elections,
oﬃce seeking candidates of parties Z = {L,R} converge in selecting a
Pareto eﬃcient distribution of local public goods in each district. The


























PROOF. The problem of ﬁscal policy design for parties seeking to













































































= 0 ∀ g∗Zi > 0, ∀ i
And ∂δ
Zc









= 0. Since parties share a common system of beliefs over




for ˜ χLi = ˜ χRi
the strategy set is the same for both parties, and candidates are not
otherwise diﬀerentiated; then parties converge in their ﬁscal platforms
toward g∗Li = g∗Ri = g∗i ∀ i (for formal proofs on the property of
the convergence of the parties policies in probabilistic voting models
with homogeneous parties, see Coughlin 1992). It follows that g∗Li =
g∗Ri = g∗i ∀ i implies ˜ χLi = ˜ χRi = 0 and fLi(0) = fRi(0) = c where
c > 0 is a non-negative constant. Therefore, the optimalityconditions
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is a weighted average elasticity of labor services-income



















. Re-arranging the terms




hi(ei)dei = Ni/NT ∀ i
we obtain
Hi(ei)





− λ∗c = 0 (10)
A similar condition to that in (10) is obtained for the local public
good provided by district −i. This is given by:138 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
H−i(e−i)







∗c = 0 (11)
















































Theorem 1 identiﬁes conditions in which the electoral compe-
tition induces parties to converge in designing moderate policies on
local public spending.18 However, Ponce (2007) provides a proba-
bilistic voting model in which the Downsian electoral competition in
a bi-party system (and multi-party systems) can lead to polarized
policies (in this last equilibrium the parties’ policies do not converge
18 In the theory of elections, a moderate policy is a policy that reﬂects the
preferences of voters at the center of the distribution of the preferences for ﬁscal
policy of the whole electorate. In contrast, polarizedpolicies might reﬂectextreme
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and might not be moderate).19 Moreover, the parties’ political com-
petition for votes in a federal election creates incentives for parties
to aggregate the beneﬁts and costs across districts of the provision of
local public goods. Hence, the provision of local public goods with
and without inter-regional spillovers is Pareto eﬃcient.
This outcome is diﬀerent from the predictions of the median voter
model (see Downs, 1957; Meltzer and Richards, 1981; and Persson
and Tabellini, 2002a) and from partisan models of electoral compe-
tition (see Roemer, 2001), because these models predict that policy
maximizes, respectively, the preferences of the median voter and the
preferences of a minority coalition of voters controlling the party on
power. In the median voter and partisan models, the parties’ design
of local public spending does not recognize the intensities of prefer-
ences of the whole electorate and as a result local spending with and
without inter-regional spillover is, in general, Pareto ineﬃcient.20
Theorem 1 also shows that parties incorporate a tradeoﬀ between
political inter-regional redistribution and eﬃciency in the design of lo-
cal public spending.21 Eﬃciency concerns take two diﬀerent forms:
the ﬁrst form of eﬃciency is the extent of inter-regional spillovers in
the provision of local public goods. At the political equilibrium g∗i is
provided where the aggregate marginal beneﬁts for residents of dis-
tricts i and −i from the provision of g∗i are equal to the marginal
costs associated with the taxes needed to be imposed by the govern-
ment to ﬁnance g∗i.22 The second concern related with eﬃciency is
19 In another paper we have relaxed the assumptions that voting behavior is
only policy oriented. In this extension, voting behavior is explained by policy and
partisan preferences (voters have a partisan identiﬁcation). The main diﬀerence
of this extension with our paper is that the parties policies do not converge in a
two party system.
20 In the median voter and partisan models, the provision of local public goods
without inter-regional spillovers could be Pareto eﬃcient if the preferences of the
median voter and the preferences of the minority coalition of voters controlling
the partisan government coincide with the preferences of the average voter in
the district. However, this can be considered as a peculiar outcome. Hence, in
general, the local public spending of the median voter and partisan models is not
Pareto eﬃcient.
21 Parties also recognize the redistributive consequences of the provision of
local public goods and income taxation for residents of each district. However, in
this paper we emphasize the role of inter-regional redistribution in the provision
of local public goods.
22 Conditions (10) and (11) are the expressions that capture the parties’ po-
litical calculus in the provision of g
∗i∀ i in which marginal aggregate beneﬁts of140 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
the dead weight costs from income taxation. These ineﬃciency costs
are related with the negative behavioral response of residents to in-
come taxation (voters tend to reduce the supply of labor when the
income tax increases) which in turn reduces both the well being of
all residents in the economy and the political support of voters for
parties in the federal election.
For this reason, parties seek to minimize the ineﬃciency costs
from taxation. In condition (3) the dead weight costs from income
taxes are characterized by the weighted average elasticity of labor sup-














< 0 the larger the ineﬃciency
costs from income taxes and the lower the provision of g∗i and g∗−i
when the spillovers of local public goods are moderate (we will ex-
plain in more detail this point in Theorem 2 below). If the spillovers
of local public goods of the high demand district (district i) are high







< 0 the larger the ineﬃciency
costs from income taxes and the lower the provision of g∗i while the
provision of the local public good in the low demand district (dis-
trict −i) would be zero (this point will be evident once we introduce
theorem 2, see below).
Parties also have political incentives to incorporate inter-regional
redistribution in the design of local public goods because parties can
redistribute the burden of the tax system to maximize the parties’ po-
litical support from voters in the federal election. To see this, we just
need to acknowledge that an increase in the provision of local public
goods entails a net positive (negative) transfer to the low (high) in-
come district since the low (high) income district pays lower (higher)
than average taxes. In our economy the larger the ratio between the





and the weighted aver-






the political incentives for parties to engage in inter-regional redis-
tribution that provides net positive transfers from the high income
district (district i) to the low income district (district −i).









the larger the provision of g∗i and g∗−i when the
spillovers of local public goods is moderate (this point will be evident
once we introduce theorem 2 below). If the spillovers of local public
goods of the high demand jurisdiction (the district i ) are high enough
all residents in the economy are equalized with the marginal aggregate costs from
g











the larger the provision
of g∗i while the provision of the local public good in the low demand
district (district −i) would be zero.
3.1. Size and Distribution of Local Public Goods
There is a renewed interest in the role of the heterogeneity of pref-
erences and the inter-regional provision of local public goods in the
theory of the political economy of ﬁscal policy design. Oates (1972,
1995) is the ﬁrst to consider that inter-regional heterogeneity in the
preferences of households for local public goods is an important fac-
tor in determining the optimal structure of government to serve cit-
izens.23 In the analysis of Oates, the heterogeneity of preferences
of households for local public goods has a strictly positive monotone
eﬀect on the inter-regional distribution of local public goods.24 More-
over, his analysis ignores the role of political competition and political
institutions.
Besley and Coate (2003) re-consider the role of the voters’ prefer-
ences for local public goods for an economy in which political competi-
tion determines ﬁscal policy since in this economy local public spend-
ing is determined by the legislature. Their analysis also suggests that
the heterogeneity of preferences of households for local public goods
has a strictly positive monotone eﬀect on the inter-regional distribu-
tion of local public goods. However, in our paper we show, under
23 The celebratedDecentralizationTheorem of Oates (1972,1995)dependshea-
vily on the role of the heterogeneity of preferences of households for local public
goods. In this theorem, a ﬁscally Pareto eﬃcient and diﬀerentiated decentralized
provision of local public goods might be welfare superior to the Pareto eﬃcient
but uniform centralizedprovision of local public goods if local public goods do not
have inter-regional spillovers, the central government does not have economies of
scale in the provisionof local public goods, and there is signiﬁcantheterogeneityof
the households’ preferences for local public goods across districts. A sub-national
system of governments can be welfare superior to the centralized provision since
the former structure of governments can deliver a diﬀerentiated provision of local
public goods that match the heterogeneityof the households’preferences for local
public goods across districts.
24 The heterogeneity of the households’ preferences across districts has a stric-
tly positive monotoneeﬀect on the inter-regionaldistributionof local public goods
if greater diﬀerences among the voters’ preferences for local public goods across
districts are translated into greater diﬀerences in the size of local public goods
across districts.142 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
general assumptions, that the cross district heterogeneity of the pref-
erences of voters over local public spending has a non-monotone eﬀect
on the distribution of local public goods. We proceed to show this
outcome in theorem 2.
THEOREM 2. The distribution and size of local public goods in districts
i and -i for our economy is given by:












i : λ∗c > 0
and ki = k−i = 0 then g∗i > 0 and g∗−i > 0 : g∗i 6= g∗−i satisfying
g∗i = Hi ￿
ei￿￿
λ∗c ∀ i.
2.ii) For λ∗c > 0, Θi = H−i ￿
e−i￿￿￿
1 − k−iHi ￿
ei￿￿
∀ i and













2.iii) For λ∗i > 0, Θi < 1 ∀ i,0 ≤ k−i < Θ−i, and 0 < Θi ≤ ki




> 0. In this last
case the provision of local public goods is uniform for districts i and
−i.
PROOF. From theorem 1, the politicallyoptimalsize of the local public
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Hence, λ∗c > 0 and ki = k−i = 0 implies g∗i > 0 and g∗−i > 0 : g∗i 6=
g∗−i satisfying g∗i = Hi ￿
ei￿￿
λ∗c ∀ i.25
Moreover, deﬁne γi =
￿
Hi(ei)





Θi = H−i(e−i)/(1−k−iHi(ei)) ∀i if 0 < ki < Θi ∀ i then γi > 0 ∀ i.
Since λ∗c > 0 and γi > 0 implies g∗i > 0 ∀ i with g∗i 6= g∗−i.
Therefore, the politico-economic Nash equilibrium in theorem 1, see












Finally, for λ∗c > 0,Θi < 1 ∀ i,0 ≤ k−i < Θ−i and 0 < Θi ≤ ki





g∗−i = 0. In this last case the provision of local public goods is
uniform for districts i and −i.
Theorem 2 shows that the heterogeneity of the voters’ preferences
for local public goods of districts i and −i does not have a monotone
eﬀect on the inter-regional provision of local public goods for all val-
ues of ki ∈ [0,1). In particular, if local public goods do not show
spillovers (for ki = k−i = 0) and for local public goods with moderate
spillovers, for spillovers on the range ki ∈ (0 , 1) : 0 < ki < Θi where
Θi = H−i￿
e−i￿￿￿
1 − k−iHi ￿
ei￿￿
∀ i, then the more heterogeneous
the shares of the population between districts i and −i and the higher
the diﬀerence between the extent of spillovers of local public goods
between districts i and −i, then the larger the diﬀerence between the
sizes of g∗i > 0 and g∗−i > 0. Therefore, for this class of equilib-
ria, the heterogeneity in the densities of population and the extent
of spillovers of local public goods between districts i and −i has a
strictly positive monotone eﬀect on the inter-regional distribution of
local public goods.
25 The condition λ∗c>0 corresponds to the set of equilibria for income taxation
in which τ
∗>0 and T
∗Zi>0 ∀ Z, ∀ i. Although τ
∗<0 and T
∗Zi<0 ∀ Z, ∀ i is
theoretically possible, this tax structure does not have empirical support. For
this reason we focus in the former equilibrium.144 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
However, the heterogeneity of the voters’ preferences for local
public goods between districts i and −i does not have a monotone
eﬀect on the provision of local public goods if spillovers of local public
goods are suﬃciently small in district −i and suﬃciently large in
district i, that is for 0 ≤ k−i < Θ−i < 1 and 0 < Θi ≤ ki, then
in this case the central government has electoral incentives to set




> 0 and g∗−i = 0. Hence, the provision
of local public goods in districts i and −i is uniform since the central
government provides a local public good only in district i.26
This last outcome is explained as follows: if diﬀerences in the
ideal size of voters over local public goods between districts i and
−i are too heterogeneous then the provision of the local public good
by the high demand jurisdiction (by district i) might drive to zero
the net marginal beneﬁt of providing a local public good in district
i (the district with the low demand for local public goods). In this
case, the best response of the elected central government is to provide
a positive local public good only in the high demand district. For
this class of equilibria, a diﬀerentiated provision of local public goods
with g∗i > 0 and g∗−i > 0 : g∗i 6= g∗−i is restored if the inter-
regional heterogeneity of preferences of voters over local public goods
(equivalently if the heterogeneity in the size of the populations across
districts and the diﬀerence in the extent of spillovers of local public
goods between districts i and −i) is moderate.
In theorem 2 the decision to provide uniform or diﬀerentiated
local public goods is endogenous while in the normative (see Oates
1972, 1995) and positive (see Besley and Coate, 2003; Persson and
Tabellini, 2002b; Lockwood, 2002) theories the central government
is constrained to provide a uniform local public good. Theorem 2
shows that the central government has political incentives to pro-
duce uniform and diﬀerentiated local public goods. These outcomes
are relevant for making meaningful comparative analysis of the de-
centralization theorem for economies in which the parties political
competition is an important determinant of ﬁscal policy design.
26 Note that in this case the ideal size of local public goods for voters in the
districtwith low demand for local publicspendingmight fall (or increase),perhaps
because of a widespread negative (or positive) income shock in that district, and
still the supply might be g∗−i=0. In this case, the diﬀerences of the voters’
preferences for local public goods between districts i and -i has increased (fallen)
but the diﬀerences in the sizes between g∗i>0 and g∗−i>0 remains the same.
Hence, the heterogeneity of the voters’ preferences for local public goods between
districts i and -i does not have a monotone eﬀect on the provision of local public
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3.2. Comparative Static Analysis on the Size and Distribution of Local
Public Goods
In what follows we develop some comparative analysis on the role of
political competition, the distribution of population in the economy,
and the size and extent of inter-regional spillovers over the size and
distribution of local public goods for a representative democracy in
which ﬁscal policy is centralized.
THEOREM 3. At the political equilibrium the following is satisﬁed:





0 < Θi < ki ∀ i then a reduction in the parties’ marginal expected
loss in votes in the election due to raising the last dollar of public
revenue through taxation (a fall of λ∗c) leads to an increase in both
g∗i and g∗−i. If λ∗c > 0, 0 ≤ k−i < Θ−i < 1 and 0 < Θi ≤ ki then
a fall of λ∗c leads to an increase only in g∗i while g∗−i = 0 remains
unchanged.
3.ii) If λ∗c > 0, Θi = H−i￿
e−i￿￿￿
1 − k−iHi ￿
ei￿￿
∀ i and
0 < Θi < ki ∀ i then an increase in the population of district i leads to
an increase in g∗i but to a fall in g∗−i. If λ∗c > 0, 0 ≤ k−i < Θ−i < 1
and 0 < Θi ≤ ki then only the size of g∗i increases as a result of
an increase in the population in district i while g∗−i = 0 remains
unchanged.





0 < Θi < ki ∀ i then an increase in the spillovers of the local public
good in district i leads to an increase in g∗i but g∗−i falls. If λ∗c > 0,
0 ≤ k−i < Θ−i < 1 and 0 < Θi ≤ ki then only the size of g∗i increases
as a result of an increase in the extent of spillovers the local public
good in district i while g∗−i = 0 remains unchanged.












are satisﬁed. By theorem (2), if λ∗c > 0, 0 < ki < Θi < 1 ∀ i,




∀i then g∗i > 0 and g∗−i >
0. The ﬁrst part of the outcomes in (3.i), (3.ii) and (3.iii) follow
directly by obtaining ∂g∗i￿
∂λ∗c < 0 ∀ i, ∂g∗i￿
∂Hi ￿
ei￿




< 0. Finally, it is also simple to show that ∂g∗i￿
∂ki >
0 and ∂g∗−i/∂ki < 0.
The second part of the outcomes in (3.i), (3.ii) and (3.iii) fol-
lows if λ∗c > 0, 0 ≤ k−i < Θ−i < 1 and 0 < Θi ≤ ki then









> 0 and ∂g∗i￿
∂ki > 0.
Theorem 3 provides a comparative static analysis of the size and
distribution of local public goods for changes in the political costs as-
sociated with income taxation (the source of funding of public spend-
ing), the distribution of the populationin each district of the economy,
and the size and distribution of the inter-regional spillovers of local
public goods in districts i and −i. Intuitively, voters want local public
goods at the lowest tax possible. Hence, a reduction in the parties’
marginal expected loss in votes in the election due to raising the last
dollar in public revenue to ﬁnance local spending through taxation (a
fall of λ∗c) leads to an increase in both g∗i and g∗−i.27
A change in the distribution of the population in the economy,
for instance an increase in the share of the population in district i,
increases the marginal beneﬁts of providing a local public good in
district i for residents of that district which tends to increase the
electoral gains for parties of an increase in g∗i. Moreover higher g∗i
implies higher external beneﬁts of g∗i on residents of district −i (due
to the spillovers of g∗i on residents of district −i) which increases
the net marginal gain of providing a local public good in district i
and reduces the net marginal gain of providing a local public good in
district −i. As a result, an increase in the share of the population in
district i leads to an increase of g∗i and to a fall of g∗−i.
Finally an increase in the extent of spillovers of the local public
good provided by district i increases the net marginal politicalbeneﬁts
of providing g∗i but this also reduces the political gains associated
with the provision of the local public good in district −i (again due
to the spillovers of g∗i on residents of district −i) which tends to
reduce g∗−i at the political equilibrium.
27 A fall in λ
∗c can be explained by a larger tax base (a larger value of labor
earnings in the economy which could be promoted by a positive shock to labor
income), a more inelastic average elasticity of labor earnings to income taxation







<0), or a lower weighted average income in the





∗i], which is a measure of the welfare and
political costs from taxation.VOTING IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS FOR LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS 147
4. Concluding Remarks
The main objective of this paper is to provide a politico-economic
analysis of how electoral competition among political parties to win
federal elections might determine both the tax policy and the inter-
governmental transfers enacted by the central government and the
size and distribution of local public goods. In particular, our pa-
per examines the inﬂuence of political competition, the role of the
inter-regional spillovers of public goods, and the heterogeneity across
districts of the voters’ preferences for local public spending in the
provision of local public goods throughout a model of probabilistic
electoral competition.
In this paper we show that the parties’ political competition for
votes in a federal election creates incentives for parties to aggregate
the beneﬁts and costs across districts in the provision of local public
goods. Hence, the provision of local public goods with and without
inter-regional spillovers is Pareto eﬃcient. This outcome is diﬀerent
from the predictions of the median voter model (see Downs, 1957;
Lockwood, 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2002b) and partisan models
of electoral competition (see Roemer, 2001) in which the provision
of local public goods with and without inter-regional spillover is, in
general, Pareto ineﬃcient.
Moreover, our paper is also diﬀerent from normative and positive
models of inter-governmental transfers since in this paper we show
that the heterogeneity of preferences of voter across districts does
not have a monotone eﬀect on the provision of local public goods for
all values of the spillovers of public spending. In particular, highly
heterogeneous preferences of voters over local public goods across
districts and/or suﬃciently high spillovers of local public spending
lead the central government to provide a uniform and Pareto eﬃcient
local public good because of strategic political behavior. In this paper,
we also characterize a class of equilibria in which a diﬀerentiated
provision of local public goods, with positive local public spending in
all districts, is compatible with the parties’ political objectives if the
inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences of voters over local public
goods and/or the spillovers of local public spending are moderate.
Finally, in this paper we provide a comparative analysis for stu-
dying the inﬂuence of political competition, the extent of inter-regio-
nal spillovers of local public goods, the distribution of the population
in the economy, and the size and distribution of local public spend-
ing. Therefore, our paper also contributes by providing hypotheses
that can be veriﬁed empirically and that seek to explain the size and148 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
inter-regional distribution of local public goods in economies with
representative democracies.
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